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AN OVERVIEW OF THE OCTOBER 2007 SUPREME COURT
TERM
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. FOUR THEMES FROM THE OCTOBER 2006 SUPREME COURT
TERM
The term which ended on June 26, 2008, was the third year of
the John Roberts Court. I want to offer a few overall thoughts about
the Court; where it is at and where it is going.
A. Theme One: A Smaller Docket
Consider the numbers concerning the October Term of 2007.
The Supreme Court decided sixty-seven cases last year, one less than
the sixty-eight cases we talked about last year at this time.1 What is
significant about these numbers is that for much of the twentieth cen-
tury the Supreme Court was deciding over 200 cases a year.2 As re-
cently as the 1980s, the Court was deciding about 160 cases per
year.3 Now it is down to sixty-seven. I cannot think of any other
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1 Erwin Chemerinsky, Nineteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: An Overview of the
October 2006 Supreme Court Term, 23 TOuRO L. REV. 731, 731 (2008).
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, Eighteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: An Overview of the
October 2005 Supreme Court Term, 22 TouRo L. REV. 873, 874 (2007).
3 Arthur D. Heilman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
403, 403 (1996) (" 'One hundred fifty cases per year' came to be regarded both as a maxi-
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court in the country that has had that kind of docket reduction. This
reduction has enormously important legal implications, paramount of
which is the fact that many important legal issues will have to wait
much longer before being resolved, and more conflicts will have to
wait a longer time before being settled.
One implication of the smaller docket-less widely noted-is
that as the number of cases goes down, the length of the opinions has
gone up. There is a perfect inverse correlation. As the number of
cases decided per year decreases, the average length of the opinion,
which is measured by the words per opinion, has increased. Legal
scholars can argue over what is the cause and what is the effect of
this phenomenon. For example, is the Court taking fewer cases be-
cause they want to write longer opinions?
My surmise is that the Court is writing longer opinions be-
cause there are fewer cases. This year there were a number of deci-
sions that produced split opinions that were over 150 pages long.4 I
have a constitutional law casebook that is used in law schools around
the country, for which I have to do an annual supplement each July.
There is no way to edit a 150-page opinion down to an assignment
manageable for law students without making a hash of it. I have a
new campaign that I will ask you to join me in: Word and page limits
should be imposed on Supreme Court opinions.
Other numbers that you should know; there were fourteen
mum and a norm for the plenary docket." (citing Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review
ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987))).
4 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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five-to-four or five-to-three decisions this year.' That is down from
the twenty-four five-to-four decisions from the term before. I do not
think this reduction is because the Court found new unanimity for
consensus this year; I think there were fewer cases that were ideo-
logically defined this year compared to the year before.
The two Justices who were most frequently in agreement this
year were Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel
Alito; 80.6 percent of the time they voted together.6 The next pair
that was most frequent in agreement were Justices Souter and Gins-
burg, followed thereafter by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ken-
nedy.7 I think the pairings give a clear sense of the ideology of the
Justices.
B. Theme Two: The Anthony Kennedy Court
My second theme is that when it matters most, it is still the
Anthony Kennedy Court. I know we call it the Roberts Court out of
tradition and deference to the Chief, but in all actuality, for the cases
that receive the most media attention-those that by any measure
matter the most-the more accurate description is the Anthony Ken-
nedy Court. A year ago when there were twenty-four, five-to-four
decisions, Anthony Kennedy was the majority in literally every one
of them. I cannot identify any other term where there existed a sig-
nificant number of five-to-four decisions where one Justice was in the
5 Linda Greenhouse, On Court That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest Mark,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008 at Al.
6 U.S. Supreme Court, Summary of the Term,
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/scotus0708/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
7 Id.
8 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 733.
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majority almost every time. This year, in the split decisions, Justice
Kennedy was in the majority more than any other Justice except
Chief Justice Roberts. He was in the majority seventy-nine percent
of the time.9 He was not in the majority in every five-to-four or five-
to-three decision, but still more than any other Associate Justice.
I am terrible at making predictions; however, when there is a
case before the Roberts Court that is likely defined by ideology, it is
easy to make the bold prediction that it is going to be a five-to-four
decision and Justice Kennedy is going to be in the majority. If noth-
ing else, this has important implications for the lawyers who appear
before the Justices and write briefs to them. I wrote a brief in a Sec-
ond Amendment case, and I can tell you my brief was a shameless at-
tempt to pander to Justice Kennedy. If I could have put Justice Ken-
nedy's picture on the front of my brief, I would have done so. My
brief was not unique among those in this case, and this case was not
unique among those on the docket. Of course, the predictions came
true.
The Second Amendment case was a five-to-four decision with
Justice Kennedy in the majority, finding the Second Amendment pro-
tects the rights of individuals to have guns other than just for militia
service.' ° Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy."1
The Court decided another case, which I regard as the most
important for this term. Boumediene v. Bush invalidated a provision
9 Greenhouse, supra note 5, at 1. See also Summary of the Term, supra note 6.
'o Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2804.
" Id. at 2787.
[Vol. 25
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of the Military Commission Act of 2006, which allowed for the re-
striction of the right of habeas corpus with respect to non-citizen
combatants held within Guantanamo.1 2 There was a five-to-four de-
cision to declare this part of the law unconstitutional. 3 Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the majority, which included Justices Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.'
4
When the Court considered whether the death penalty for
child rape is cruel and unusual punishment, in another five-to-four
decision, Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority, joined by Jus-
tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, saying the death penalty for child
rape is cruel and unusual punishment;1 5 the death penalty can be used
only for the intentional taking of life from another.' 6 My point is that
when it matters the most, it is the Anthony Kennedy Court.
C. Theme Three: A Year for Business
My third observation about the Court is that it is the most pro-
business Supreme Court there has been since the mid-1930s.17 John
Roberts is much more interested in business litigation than were his
recent predecessors on the Court: William Rehnquist, Earl Warren,
and Warren Burger. Roberts was, for much of his career, except
when in government service, a business litigator before the United
States Supreme Court, as such, his attitude and the attitudes of the
12 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
"3 Id. at 2277.
14 Id. at 2240.
15 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
16 Id. at 2660.
17 Erwin Chemerinsky, When it Matters Most, it is Still the Kennedy Court, 11 GREEN
BAG 2D 427,438 (2008).
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majority of the Court are pro-business. 1
8
There were four preemption cases this year involving business
challenges to state and local regulations. All four came down on the
side of finding preemption.' 9 The majority of the cases decided in the
three years of the Roberts Court have come down on the side of find-
ing preemption when involving a business challenge to state and local
regulation.2 °
Two quick examples; one particularly important case is Riegel
v. Medtronic.21 The issue is if the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proves a medical device, does that preempt the state for the liabil-
ity?
22
The federal Medical Device Amendments say if the FDA ap-
proves a medical device, states cannot impose "requirements" incon-
sistent with federal law. 23 Is tort liability preempted by the preclu-
sion of additional requirements? The Supreme Court eight-to-one
said yes. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court; only Justice Ginsburg
dissented.24 Justice Scalia said liability, like regulation, can impose
additional requirements; therefore, federal law preempts state tort li-
ability just as it preempts direct state regulation.25 Justice Ginsburg,
in her sole dissent, said there is supposed to be a presumption against
18 Id.
19 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008); Preston
v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008);
Rowe v. N. H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2008).
20 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through
Federal Preemption Doctrine: Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 869, 875 (2008).
21 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
22 Id. at 1002.
23 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (2002).
24 See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 1007-11 (majority opinion).
546 [Vol. 25
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federal preemption.26 She said where Congress wants to preempt li-
ability, it knows how to do so. There are many federal laws that pre-
empt state liability. She said, here, Congress did not do that, so there
should be no preemption.27
Another example from last term is a case called Chamber of
Commerce v. Brown.28 California has a law that says if an entity re-
ceives more than $10,000 in state money, it cannot use those state
funds to engage in antiunion organizing activity. 29 The business can
still use its own money to engage in speech discouraging union orga-
nizing, it just cannot use the state money for this.3 °
Unlike Riegel v. Medtronic, there is no express preemption
provision in federal law.3' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seven-to-
two found preemption.3 2 Justice Stevens wrote for the Court; Justice
Breyer dissented and Justice Ginsburg joined.33 Justice Stevens' ma-
jority opinion said that the whole scheme of federal labor law showed
26 Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Preemption analysis starts with the assumption
that 'historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded ... unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
27 See generally id. at 1013-20.
28 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
29 See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West Supp. 2008).
30 Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2411.
"To ensure compliance with the grant and program restrictions at issue
in this case, [the statute] establishes a formidable enforcement scheme.
Covered employers must certify that no state funds will be used for pro-
hibited expenditures; the employer must also maintain and provide upon
request "records sufficient to show that no state funds were used for
those expenditures."
Id. (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16645.2(c), 16645.7(b)-(c)).
"' Id. at 2412 ("the [National Labor Relations Act] itself contains no express pre-emption
provision").
32 Id. (holding "the [California statutes] are pre-empted under Machinists [v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm 'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)], because they regulate within 'a zone
protected and reserved for market freedom' ").
33 Id. at 24 10.
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that the Congress meant to occupy the field with regard to regulating
employer and employee speech.34 Justice Stevens said Congress in-
dicated a desire that employers be free to speak against union organ-
izers just like unions can speak for it.
35
Justice Breyer in his dissent said this case is just the state say-
ing that it does not want state money to be used in a certain way.36
He said under federalism and state rights, a state can do that. Busi-
nesses are still free to use their own money to engage in anti-
unionizing speech and activities.
37
Why is this? Why is the Roberts Court finding preemption in
every case where this issue has been raised? One might think that a
conservative Court would want to narrow the reach of the federal
preemption. After all, one way to empower state and local govern-
ments is to limit the situations warranting federal preemption. I think
that the conservatives on the Roberts Court are, above all, probusi-
ness. 38 I think the more liberal Justices on the Roberts Court tend to
favor expansive federal power.
39
There were also punitive damages cases decided this term,
34 Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2412 (reasoning that a second type of pre-emption exists "to regu-
late conduct that Congress intended be unregulated because left [sic] to be controlled by the
free play of economic forces" (internal quotations omitted)).
" Id. at 2413-14 ("[T]he amendment to § 7 calls attention to the right of employees to re-
fuse to join unions, which implies an underlying right to receive information opposing un-
ionization.").
36 Id. at 2419-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("California's statute ... does not seek to compel
labor-related activity. Nor does it seek to forbid labor-related activity.").
37 Id. at 2420 ("It permits all employers who receive state funds to 'assist, promote, or de-
ter union organizing.' It simply says to those employers, do not do so on our dime.").
38 Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts are traditionally known as the
conservative justices.
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such as Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.40 For the second time in the
last two years, the Court found significant limits on punitive dam-
ages. The Court held that under the common law of maritime com-
pensatory and punitive damages had to be in a one-to-one relation-
ship. This year's case was the common law case, not a constitutional
ruling. But Justice Souter's reasoning for the majority was about ju-
ries having too much discretion in awarding punitive damages, and
that punitive damage awards are too unpredictable. 4' His solution,
that there should be a one-to-one ratio in common law and in com-
mon law maritime law between punitive damages and compensatory
damages, has far-reaching implications if it is followed in other
cases.
42
The most important corporate case to be decided in the Su-
preme Court in many years was Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,43 wherein the Supreme Court limited the
ability of investors to sue, in this case, vendors who were part of a
fraudulent scheme.44
The only exceptions this year to the Court being pro-business,
were two important employment discrimination cases where the em-
ployees prevailed. In the major employment discrimination case
from last term, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., the Court
came down on the side of the employer.45 The Supreme Court im-
40 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
41 Id. at 2625-30.
42 Id. at 2633.
41 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
44 Id. at 766.
41 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2008).
549
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posed a strict statute of limitations to pay discrimination claims under
Title VII.
46
This year, CBOCS West, Inc.v. Humphries47 and Gomez-Perez
v. Potter48 were the two most important employment civil rights
cases. Each concluded that, unless Congress specifically finds oth-
erwise, statutes prohibiting discrimination include a cause of action
for those who complain of retaliation for bringing discrimination
claims.49 These cases represent the most important loss for business
of the term.
D. Theme Four: Looking Ahead Towards the Future
of the Court
Fourth and finally, it is worth looking ahead. What is the No-
vember 2008 election likely to mean for the future of the Supreme
Court? 50 The bottom line, I think, is that the next election is going to
determine whether the Supreme Court becomes politically more con-
servative or stays ideologically where it is now.5' It is very unlikely
that the coming election will cause the Supreme Court to become
more liberal in the short term.
There is an easy basis for this prediction. Think about where
the vacancies are likely to come on the Court between January 20,
46 Id. at 2177; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 23
ToURo L. REv. 843, 846 (2008).
47 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
48 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
49 CBOCS, 128 S. Ct. at 1954-60; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935.
50 This talk was given in October 2008 before the presidential election.
51 See generally Bill Mears, Election Could Decide the Future of the Federal Courts,
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2009, and January 20, 2013. John Paul Stevens turned eighty-eight
years old on April 21 st of this year. He is in good health, but it seems
unlikely he will still be on the Court at age ninety-three in 2013.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg will soon turn seventy-five. She, too, is in
good health, but perhaps because she is frail in appearance, there are
rumors that she might step down. There is a widely-circulated rumor
that David Souter wants to retire and go home to New Hampshire.
Now think about the other side of the ideological aisle. John Roberts
turned fifty-four in January of this year. If he remains on the Court
until he is eighty-eight, the current age of John Paul Stevens, he will
be Chief Justice until the year 2042. Clarence Thomas is sixty, and
Samuel Alito, fifty-eight, are also unlikely to step down anytime
soon. Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy both turned seventy-two
this year; I think the best predictor of a long life span is being con-
firmed for a seat on the Supreme Court.
It is not likely that any of these five Justices are going to be
leaving the Court in the next five years, or maybe the next ten years.
So, if it is Senator McCain replacing Justice Stevens, Justice Gins-
burg, and Justice Souter, then the Court is going to become signifi-
cantly more conservative, and no longer will Anthony Kennedy be
the swing justice. If it is Senator Obama replacing Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, or Souter, he is likely to do so with individuals with the
same ideology, so the Court is not going to become more liberal over
the next five, or maybe the next ten years. I guess the bottom line of
the Supreme Court now, and in the foreseeable future is, if you are
politically conservative, it is a Court to rejoice over. If you are po-
11
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litically liberal, you should be glad the Court is deciding only about
sixty-seven cases a year.
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